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MIXED QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
BERNARD SCHWARTZt
J UDICIAL review of administrative action is based upon the distinction
between "law" and "fact". Questions of law are to be decided ju-
dicially, for the judge, both by training and tradition, is best equipped to
deal with them. "Our desire to have courts determine questions of law is
related to a belief in their possession of expertness with regard to such
questions."' These considerations do not apply with equal force to the
judicial review of the factual issues arising out of administrative deter-
minations. There, the advantages of expertise are with the administrator.
The fact "findings of an expert commission have a validity to which no
judicial examination can pretend; the decision, for instance, of the New
York Public Service Commission that a gas company ought to provide
gas service for a given district is almost inevitably more right than a
decision pronounced by the Courts in a similar case." 2
A theory of review based upon the "law-fact" distinction assumes that
there is a more or less clear-cut division between "law' and "fact", with
the former for the judge and the latter for the administrator. "This sep-
aration of law and fact sounds attractively simple.... The administrative
tribunal would find the facts and the courts would not interfere unless the
absence of evidence or the perversity of the finding required them to
intervene."' In fact, however, the distinction between "law" and "fact"
is not nearly so well-defined as is often supposed. "The judges, who have
the last word, can confidently draw the line between law and fact; for
the rest of us it is not so easy."4 There is a certain ambiguity about the
terms in practice which makes it difficult in many cases confidently to
ascertain which is which prior to court decision.
"Whether or not a man was walking along the sidewalk on a certain
street of a certain afternoon is a question of fact. Whether a coal hole
on the sidewalk was or was not covered is a question of fact. Whether or
not the man fell into the coal hole is question of fact. In each case, the
fact is ascertainable by observation; there can be no question of judg-
ment or opinion. As a matter of law, however, the liability of the person
or corporation chargeable with the condition of the coal hole may depend
upon whether or not it was reasonably guarded. This will depend upon
t Assistant Professor of Law, New York University.
1. Lp.mis, THE Amumrsmcr-v PROCESS 152 (1938) (italics omitted).
2. LAsri, A GRAmmR or Pourics 393 (4th ed. 1938).
3. CAR, CONCERnNG ENGLISH AX~mhISTRATIVE LAW 103 (1941).
4. Ibid.
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two questions. It will depend upon the physical character, location, and
surroundings of the hole, and it will depend upon whether those physical
factors conform to the standard of reasonableness which the law demands.
The former is a question of fact, but what is the latter?"'
In such cases, "law" and "fact" are not two mutually exclusive kinds
of questions, so that the scope of review becomes a mere mechanical
matter, depending upon the category in which the finding at issue falls.
The reviewing court itself has the final word upon whether the particular
finding is one of "law" or 'fact", and in deciding that question it, in
effect, determines whether the review of that finding is to be a broad or
narrow one. "The knife of policy alone effects an artificial cleavage at
the point where the court chooses to draw the line between public interest
and private right."' As one observer has pointed out, "since all rules of
law are something more than abstract propositions of logic, and depend
for their meaning on their relevance to certain states of fact, it is inevit-
able that Courts should often lay down as matters of law what are really
in essence matters of fact."'
The difficulty in applying the distinction between law and fact in con-
crete cases has led to the terming of a large number of questions as "mixed
questions of law and fact." As Justice Jackson has put it: "Perhaps the
chief difficulty in consistent and uniform compliance with the congres-
sional limitation upon court review lies in the want of a certain standard
for distinguishing 'questions of law' from 'questions of fact.' This is the
test Congress has directed, but its difficulties in practice are well known
and have been the subject of frequent comment. Its difficulty is reflected
in our labelling some questions as 'mixed questions of law and fact' and in
a great number of opinions distinguishing 'ultimate facts' from evidentiary
facts."'
In many ways, the judicial treatment of the so-called "mixed questions
of law and fact" goes to the very heart of the problem of the scope of
review. If they are termed "questions of law," the courts are enabled
to exercise a broad reviewing power; if they are treated as "questions of
fact," judicial review is narrowed by the substantial evidence rule. The
extent of review thus depends upon which side of the "law-fact" dividing
line the particular finding is seen to fall. This problem, one should note,
is not confined to American administrative law. "What I have many times
in this House protested against," said Lord Atkinson in Great Western
Ry. Co. v. Bater,9 "is the attempt to secure for a finding on a mixed
5. HENDERSON, TEE FEDERAL TRADE COMISSION 93 (1924).
6. DICKINSON, ADMImISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND TElE SUPREMACY or LAW 55 (1927).
7. ALr, LAW AND ORDERS 160 (1945).
8. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 500 (1943).
9. (1922] 2 A. C. 1.
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question of law and fact the unassailability which belongs only to a find-
ing on questions of pure fact. This is sought to be effected by styling the
finding on a mixed question of law and fact, a finding of fact."10
"Most frequently, particularly in recent years in the administrative
law field, the problem has arisen in connection with the application of
statutory language to particular states of fact."' Though the adminis-
trative findings in these cases are basically findings of fact-e.g., whether
the subjects of particular administrative determinations fall within a
statutory category may largely depend upon their factual characteristics
-they also involve questions of statutory interpretation, in the defining
of the category itself. Ultimately, the scope of review in these cases de-
pends upon whether the application of the statutory category to the par-
ticular factual situation--i.e., the application of law to fact-is thought
of as being a judicial or administrative function.
Under the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914,12 the Federal Trade
Commission was "empowered and directed to prevent persons, partner-
ships, or corporations ... from using unfair methods of competition in
commerce .... I's Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz" was the first
important case dealing with the application by the Commisson of the
statutory standard of "unfair methods of competition" to specific business
practices. The Supreme Court reversed the conclusion of the Commission
that the trade practices in that case constituted such unfair methods.
In so doing, the Court did not confine itself to the question of whether
there was an evidentiary basis for the administrative conclusion. "The
Court instead conceived its function to embrace the right to determine in-
dependently what the appropriate rule of law should be. Its approach
was identical with that which it would possess were it reviewing a legal
ruling by a lower court."'1 The application of the statutory concept to
the particular situation is thus treated by the Court as a pure question
of law. "The words 'unfair methods of competition,'" said Justice Mc-
Reynolds, "are not defined by the statute and their exact meaning is in
dispute. It is for the courts, not the commission, ultimately to determine
as matter of law what they include."'"
The holding of the Gratz case and others in accord was of great prac-
tical consequence for the work of the Federal Trade Commission, "for if
10. Id. at 12.
ii. Stem, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comiparatve
Analysis, SS HAv. L. REv. 70, 94 (1944).
12. 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1946).
13. 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 1. U.S.C. § 45 (1946).
14. 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
15. LJADIS, TnE ADDwmumTrVE PRocEss 150 (1938).
16. 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920).
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the Commission is, by these decisions, shorn of all power to exercise ad-
ministrative discretion in matters of unfair competition or of restraint
of trade and monopoly, it has become little more than a subordinate ad-
junct of the judicial system."'1 7 The later cases have, therefore, tended
to depart from the doctrine of the Gratz case by assigning great weight
to the conclusion of the Commission that particular business practices
fall within the statutory concept of "unfair methods of competition."
Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute8 indicates the extent
to which the Supreme Court has receded from the view expressed in the
Gratz case. There the Commission had issued a cease and desist order
against the multiple basing point system of pricing used in the cement
industry. The effect of such an order is, to say the least, very widespread
in view of the prevalence of the method of pricing involved. "Clearly if
such an order by the Commission were to be sustained, it would not only
write an entire chapter of new law but would bring about a major revolu-
tion not merely in marketing methods but in the distribution and location
of American industry."'19 Under the Gratz case, the holding of the Com-
mission that the basing point system of pricing constituted an unfair
method of competition would be reviewed by the Court upon its own
independent judgment as a question of law. In the Cement Institute case,
the Court implies that the scope of review is narrower. "We sustain the
Commission's holding that concerted maintenance of the basing point
delivered price system is an unfair method of competition prohibited
by the Federal Trade Commission Act. In so doing we give great weight
to the Commission's conclusion, as this court has done in other cases.
[Emphasis is laid upon the expertness of the agency as a reason for nar-
rowing review.] We are persuaded that the Commission's long and close
examination of the questions it here decided has provided it with pre-
cisely the experience that fits it for performance of its statutory duty." 0
In a series of recent cases, as well as some not so recent, the Court has
gone even further in limiting the scope of review on so-called "mixed
questions of law and fact. ' 2 ' Among the important cases of this type is
Gray v. Powell," which was decided in 1941. That case involved the
Bituminous Coal Act of 1937,1 which sought to fix minimum prices for
the bituminous coal industry, though exempting from its provisions
17. HENDERSoN, TuE FEDERAL TRADE CommIssioN 102 (1924).
18. 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
19. Dickinson, Judicial Characteristics of Administrative Regulation, 23 N. Y. U. L. Q.
REv. 239, 258 (1948).
20. 333 U.S. 683, 720 (1948).
21. See Stem, supra note 10, at 99.
22. 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
23. 50 STAT. 72 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 828 (1946).
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"coal consumed by the producer or .. .transported by the producer to
himself for consumption by him."2 4 The respondent company in the in-
stant case asserted that it was a producer-consumer within this section
and hence entitled to exemption from the Act. The administrative agency,
the Bituminous Coal Division, held that the respondent was not a "pro-
ducer" consuming its own product and issued an order denying the
claimed exemption.
This administrative determination was sustained by the Supreme Court
in language which implied that the question at issue was wholly within
the administrative competence and not subject to wider review than ad-
ministrative findings of pure fact. "Such a determination as is here in-
volved belongs to the usual administrative routine. Congress, which
could have legislated specifically as to the individual exemptions from
the code, found it more efficient to delegate that function to those whose
experience in a particular field gave promise of a better informed, more
equitable, adjustment of the conflicting interests of price stabilization
upon the one hand and producer consumption upon the other .... Where,
as here, a determination has been left to an administrative body, this
delegation will be respected and the administrative conclusion left un-
touched. Certainly, a finding on Congressional reference that an ad-
mittedly constitutional act is applicable to a particular situation does not
require such further scrutiny. Although we have here no dispute as to
the evidentiary facts, that does not permit a court to substitute its judg-
ment for that of the Director. It is not the province of a court to absorb
the administrative functions to such an extent that the executive or
legislative agencies become mere fact-finding bodies deprived of the ad-
vantages of prompt and definite action."2
Gray v. Powell seems to mark a definite break with earlier doctrine as
to the scope of review in connection with the administrative application
of statutory language to particular states of fact. This is shown by the
analysis in Justice Roberts' dissenting opinion. "Upon a record in which
there is not a single disputed fact, the bare question is presented whether
the words the Congress used bring the respondents within the Bituminous
Coal Code or exclude them from its operation. In answering that ques-
tion, the Director made no controverted finding of fact, exercised no
judgment as to what the relevant circumstances were, but merely decided
that the meaning of the statute was that the respondents' transactions
required that they become members of the Code or suffer the penalty.
... If the Director was in error, his error was a misconstruction of the Act
24. 50 STAT. 77 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 833 (1946).
25. 314 U.S. 402, 411 (1941).
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which created his office; and that error, under all relevant authorities, is
subject to court review."2
Under Gray v. Powell, the scope of review on these "mixed questions of
law and fact" is assimilated to that on findings of pure fact. In both
cases, review is limited by the substantial evidence rule-the court looks
only to see that there is an evidentiary basis for the administrative find-
ing. Gray v. Powell thus "accords to an administrative tribunal's ration-
ally supportable interpretation of the statute under which it operates
the same binding force that the substantial evidence rule accords to the
tribunal's rationally supportable determinations of fact.127 This doctrine
of review has been applied in a number of recent cases, and seems by
now to be established in federal administrative law. Thus, it has been
followed in determining whether a particular carrier is an "interurban
railway" within the meaning of an exemption from the Railway Labor
Act of 1934;28 whether one company has "control" of another within
the meaning of the Communications Act of 1934;29 whether a worker is
a "member of a crew" within the meaning of an exemption from the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1927;"°
whether an injury arose "out of and in the course of employment" so as
to give rise to a workmen's compensation award under the same Act;,"
and whether a worker is an "employee" so as to come within the pro-
visions of the National Labor Relations Act of 193532 or the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 193 8 .1 In these cases "where the question is one of
specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which
the agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the
reviewing court's function is limited. . . . the Board's determination
that specified persons are 'employees' under this Act is to be accepted
if it has 'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis in law.) 4
26. Id. at 418.
27. Benjamin, Judicial Review of Administrative Adjudication: Some Recent Decisions
of the New York Court of Appeals, 48 COL. L. REv. 1, 12 (1948).
28. Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R. Co., 305 U.S. 177 (1938).
29. Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939).
30. Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565 (1944); South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v.
Bassett, 309 U. S. 251 (1940).
31. Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947); Parker v. Motor
Boat Sales, 314 U.S. 244 (1941).
32. National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
33. Fleming v. Demeritt Co., 56 F. Supp. 376 (D. C. Vt. 1944).
34. National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944).
See, similarly, Unemployment Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143 (1946). Cf. Flshgold v.
Sullivan Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 290 (1946), where the court implied that the doctrine of Gray
v. Powell applies only to interpretations made in adversary proceedings by administrative
agencies entrusted with the responsibility of making inter partes decisions.
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The present rule with regard to the review of "mixed questions of law
and fact" can be gathered from the opinion of Justice Jackson in Dobson
v. Commissioner:35 "Congress has vested the Tax Court with primary au-
thority for redetermining deficiencies, which constitutes the greater part
of tax litigation. This requires it to consider both law and facts. What-
ever latitude exists in resolving questions such as those of proper ac-
counting, treating a series of transactions as one for tax purposes, or
treating apparently separate ones as single in their tax consequences,
exists in the Tax Court and not in the regular courts; when the court
cannot separate the elements of a decision so as to identify a clear-cut
mistake of law, the decision of the Tax Court must stand."30 Or, in other
words, unless the question at issue is seen to be wholly one of law, the
scope of review is no wider than that over administrative findings of fact.
"Where there is a mixed question of law and fact, and the court cannot
so separate it as to show clearly where the mistake of law is, the decision
of the tribunal to which the law has confided the matter is conclusive."3 7
The division of functions here between the reviewing court and the
administrative agency approaches that between court and jury. A jury in
a negligence case, for example, normally returns a general verdict com-
pounded of both law and fact. In these cases, the jury does more than
merely find the facts, for "it is, in fact, ordinarily, the jury that has the
application of the law to the facts."38 The jury's verdict "is more nearly
akin to a declaration of law than to a finding of fact, since it does create
obligatory standards, which, if created by the jury, are, it is true, binding
in only the particular case then before it, but which none the less are
the standards by which the conduct of the parties to that litigation is
to be judged to determine their respective legal rights and liabilities.""0
The reasons which have led the courts to respect the conclusions of juries
with regard to the application of statutory standards to particular factual
situations apply with even greater force to the similar conclusions of
administrative agenices. "Is there anything in the Constitution," asks
a lower federal court, "which expressly makes findings of fact by a jury
of inexperienced laymen, if supported by substantial evidence, conclu-
35. 320 U.S. 4S9 (1943).
36. Id. at 502. In so far as the Tax Court is concerned, Section 1141 (a) of the Internal
Revenue Code was amended in 1948 so that review of the decisions of the Tax Court now
proceeds in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of federal district courts
in civil actions tried without a jury. This changes the rule of the Dobson case with regard
to review of Tax Court decisions.
37. Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, 109 (1904) ; citing Justice Miller in Mar-
quez v. Frisbie, 101 U.S. 473, 476 (1879).
38. TnAY=a, PPELnwnARy TaEATisES o EvnicNCE 252 (1898).
39. Bonr.Ex, Sruius ix LAW or ToRTs 605 (1926).
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sive, that prohibits Congress making findings of fact by a highly trained
and especially qualified administrative agency likewise conclusive, pro-
vided they are supported by substantial evidence?" 40 In this field of
review of "mixed questions of law and fact," at any rate, the federal
courts are now "attempting to give to the findings of administrative bodies
the respect paid to those of a jury when it returns a general verdict."'1
There is, however, one very important difference between the type of
administrative finding we have been considering and the conclusion
of a jury embodied in a general verdict. The finding at issue in Gray
v. Powell, for example, is not only a mixed finding of "law" and "fact",
but is also a finding of "jurisdictional fact" in the sense that its existence
is a condition precedent to the lawful exercise of the administrative au-
thority. The administrative power to act in that case was dependent upon
the finding that the respondent was not a "producer-consumer," for the
enabling Act was not operative in the absence of such a finding. To
apply the doctrine of limited review to such cases would seem to run
counter to the general policy of Anglo-American law against allowing
inferior tribunals finally to determine the limits of their own jurisdiction.
"An [administrative] agency may not finally decide the limits of its
statutory power," the Supreme Court has asserted. "That is a judicial
function. 42 Where the administrative jurisdiction depends upon a finding
of fact, the reviewing court should be able to determine upon its own
independent judgment whether or not that finding is correct. "The law
is settled that where a jurisdiction is given to a tribunal in certain events,
the jurisdiction only arises on the actual happening of those events. If
they have not happened in fact, they cannot obtain jurisdiction by wrongly
deciding that they have happened."'
Under Gray v. Powell and other similar decisions, discussed above, re-
view of "jurisdictional fact" findings of the type at issue in those de-
cisions, is no broader than that of ordinary findings of fact. That there
are strong practical considerations to support this further judicial with-
drawal in favor of administrative expertise can be seen from a reading of
Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Crowell v. Benson." At the same
time, however, there is great danger from the point of view of effective
judicial control of administrative action in over-deference by the courts
40. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 322, 327 (W. D. Mo. 1935).
41. Albertsworth, Judicial Review of Administrative Action by the Federal Supreme
Court, 35 HARv. L. REV. 127, 151 (1921).
42. Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946).
43. Rex v. Local Government Board, (1922] 2 Ir.R. 76, 93. Compare the language of
Farwell, L.J., in Rex v. Shoreditch Assessment Committee, [1910] 2'K. B. 859, at 880.
44. 285 U.S. 22, 65 (1932).
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to administrative fact findings upon which the existence of jurisdiction
depends.
This can be illustrated by Packard Motor Co. v. National Labor Re-
lations Board,4 5 where the Board had decided that the foremen employed
by appellant company constituted an appropriate bargaining unit and
had certified their union as the exclusive bargaining representative. The
company asserted that foremen were not "employees" entitled to the ad-
vantages of the Labor Act, and refused to bargain with the union.
The finding of the Board here is of the type involved in Gray v. Powell
-. e., one involving the application of a statutory definition to a particu-
lar factual situation-and is likewise "jurisdictional," in that the Act un-
der which the Board operates is not applicable in the absence of the
"employer-employee" relationship. Under Gray v. Powell, the scope of
review of such a finding should be limited by the substantial evidence
rule, just as though the finding were wholly one of fact, and this, in effect,
is the theory of review applied by the majority of the Court. "There is
clearly substantial evidence in support of the determination that foremen
are an appropriate unit by themselves," says Justice Jackson, "and there
is equal evidence that, while the foremen included in this unit have differ-
ent degrees of responsibility and work at different levels of authority,
they have such a common relationship to the enterprise and to other
levels of workmen that inclusion of all such grades of foremen in a single
unit is appropriate. Hence the order insofar as it depends on facts is
beyond our power of review. . . .Whatever special questions there are
in determining the appropriate bargaining units for foremen are for the
Board, and the history of the issue in the Board show the difficulty of
the problem committed to its discretion. We are not at liberty to be gov-
erned by those policy considerations in deciding the naked question of
law whether the Board is now, in this case, acting within the terms of the
statute.46
Yet, wholly apart from the question of whether such foremen should be
encouraged to organize for collective bargaining, it would seem that this
is the type of case where review limited by the substantial evidence rule is
too narrow. The Board, by its finding on the "jurisdictional fact" of the
existence of the "employer-employee" relationship, has extended the
benefits of a labor statute to a group of supervisory employees who are
not expressly covered by the Act, and who have in the past normally been
45. 330 'U.S. 4S5 (1947).
46. Id. at 491. Under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, supervisory em-
ployees of the type involved in the Packard case no longer come within the term "employee"
in the Labor Act. See L.A. Young Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 163 F.2d 905
(D. C. Cir. 1947).
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identified with the interest of management. "Trade union history shows
that foremen were the arms and legs of management in executing labor
policies. In industrial conflicts they were allied with management. Man-
agexment indeed commonly acted through them in the unfair labor prac-
tices which the Act condemns." 4 It is perhaps not too much to say that
the Board has, in effect, re-written the governing statute through its
interpretation of the statutory definition. "For if foremen are 'employees'
within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, so are vice-
presidents, managers, assistant managers, superintendents, assistant
superintendents-indeed, all who are on the payroll of the company, in-
cluding the president; all who are commonly referred to as the manage-
ment, with the exception of the directors. If a union of vice-presidents
applied for recognition as a collective bargaining agency, I do not see
how we could deny it and yet allow the present application."48
This is not to say, of course, that supervisory employees such as those
involved in the Packard case should not be permitted to bargain collec-
tively. "What I have said does not mean that foremen have no right to
organize for collective bargaining. 40  But apart from the merits, one
wonders whether the administrative determination that the protection
of the Act should extend to such foremen should be vested with the same
degree of finality as administrative findings of pure fact. Surely this is
the type of case where the "jurisdictional fact" doctrine should compel
a broad review of the administrative finding. This case indicates the
dangers inherent in the recent tendency of the Court to abandon the
"jurisdictional fact" doctrine, for here the extension of the enabling legis-
lation by the administrative body acting in pursuance of its general policy
is placed in a position of finality, although the Board has been "vested
merely with the authority of general words of power. ''ao
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
In the first portion of this paper, we have seen how the scope of review
over "mixed questions of law and fact"-especially those involving the
application of statutory language to particular states of fact-has been
narrowed by the federal courts so that review of such questions has
tended to be similar to that available over administrative findings of fact.
We will now seek to determine whether this tendency has been affected
by the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.1
47. justice Douglas, dissenting, in Packard Motor Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
330 U.S. 485, 496 (1947).
48. Id. at 494.
49. Id. at 500.
So. Lord Shaw, dissenting, in Rex. v. Halliday, [1917] A. C. 260, 300.
51. 60 STAT. 237, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1946).
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For our purposes, the key language in the Act is to be found in the
first sentence of Section 10 (e), dealing with the scope of review, which
reads: "So far as necessary to decision and where presented the review-
ing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitu-
tional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applica-
bility of the terms of any agency action.""2
Under the test of Dobson v. Commissioner, which has already been
discussed, "when the court cannot separate the elements of a decision
so as to identify a clear-cut mistake of law, the decision of the [adminis-
trative agency] must stand."'  It has been asserted by Professor Dickin-
son that "such a position on the part of the courts will henceforth be
hard to square with the specific language of the first sentence of para-
graph (e) of Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, if that
sentence is given the effect which an objective reading of its words seems
to require. The reviewing court is there not merely given the power, but
[by] the word 'shall' is placed under an obligation, not only to 'interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions' but to 'decide all relevant ques-
tions of law'; and then follow the additional words which impose on the
reviewing court itself the further duty of determining 'the meaning or
applicability of the terms of any agency action.' "15
One may sympathize with the desire expressed in the above statement
that the Act be interpreted as broadening the scope of review over ques-
tions of the type we have been considering. Whether the first sentence
of Section 10 (e) does, in fact, lead to that result is, however, quite an-
other matter. In the first place, there is the obligation imposed on the
reviewing court by that section to "decide all relevant questions of law."
But this brings us back to the basic question: What is fact and what
is law? If we assume, as Professor Dickinson seems to do, that the ques-
tion in a case like Gray v. Powell---e., one involving the application of
a statutory term to a particular state of fact, there whether respondent
was a "producer" consuming its own product-is a question of law, then
we are, of course, impelled to his conclusion, for Section 10 (e) of the
Act requires the reviewing court to decide questions of law. Yet, is such
a question so clearly a question of law as to compel the federal courts
to abandon the theory of review which they have followed consistently
since Gray v. Powell?
It is undoubtedly true, as Justice Murphy pointed out in Cardillo v.
Liberty Mutual Co..," that questions of the type we have been concerned
52. 60 STAT. 243, 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1946).
53. 320 U.S. 489, 502 (1943).
54. Tim FEu. A R nmsmAanvE PRocEouRE AcT tam lTE Amm.-naxwE AcE=
584 (Warren ed. 1947).
55. 330 U.S 469 (1947).
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with can be considered "more legal than factual in nature."r' 0 That does
not, however, necessarily make them questions of law which must be
decided by the reviewing court within 'the meaning of the Act. In the
Cardillo case, the Court dealt with the finding by the Deputy Commis-
sioner in a compensation proceeding under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Worker's Compensation Act17 that the particular injury was one
"arising out of and in the course of employment." Such a finding was
essential before a compensation order could be made under the Act, and
such an order could be set aside through injunction proceedings instituted
in the federal district courts "if not in accordance with law."5 8
The scope of review of the administrative finding in the Cardillo case
appears to be similar to that in Gray v. Powell. "In determining whether
a particular injury arose out of and in the course of employment, the
Deputy Commissioner must necessarily draw an inference from what he
has found to be the basic facts. The propriety of that inference, of
course, is vital to the validity of the order subsequently entered. But
the scope of judicial review of that inference is sharply limited ...
If supported by evidence and not inconsistent with the law, the Deputy
Commissioner's inference that an injury did or did not arise out of and
in the course of employment is conclusive.""" And, dealing directly with
the type of question with which we have been concerned, Justice Murphy
goes on to say that "the fact that the inference of the type here made...
involves an application of a broad statutory term or phrase to a specific
set of facts gives rise to no greater scope of judicial review .... and the
reviewing court's function is exhausted when it becomes evident that the
Deputy Commissioner's choice has substantial roots in the evidence and
is not forbidden by the law. Such is the result of the statutory provision
permitting the suspension or setting aside of compensation orders only
'if not in accordance with law.' "60
The Cardillo case indicates that the duty imposed on reviewing courts
by Section 10 (e) of the Act to decide relevant questions of law will not
broaden the scope of review of Gray v. Powell type questions. Review
under the Longshoremen's Act would seem to give the courts the same
review power as the portion of Section 10 (e) that we have been discuss-
ing, as the courts must decide questions of law in determining whether
an order is "not in accordance with law." The "questions of law" phrase
in the first sentence of Section 10 (e) of the Act would seem, indeed, to
56. Id. at 478.
57. 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1946).
58. 44 STAT. 1436 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 921 (B) (1946).
59. 330 U.S. 469, 477 (1947).
60. Id. at 478.
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be merely a legislative restatement of the familiar review principle that
questions of law are for the reviewing court, at the same time leaving to
the courts the task of determining in each case what are questions of law.
It is most unlikely that the federal courts will hold that the type of
question we have been concerned with is now a question of law within
the meaning of the Act.
In addition to directing the reviewing court to decide relevant questions
of law, the first sentence of Section 10 (e) of the Act directs it to "interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions". Does not the application of a
statutory term to a particular state oi facts involve statutory interpreta-
tion within the meaning of this provision? If it does, then the first sen-
tence of Section 10 (e) would seem to broaden the scope of review in the
Gray v. Powell type of case, for it requires the reviewing court itself to
perform the function of statutory interpretation.
A leading authority on statutory interpretation has divided the steps
in the judicial process of interpreting statutes into three parts: (1) find-
ing or choosing the proper statute or statutes applicable; (2) interpreting
the statute law in its technical sense; and (3) applying the meaning, so
found, to the case at hand. 1 If Section 10 (e) of the Act uses statutory
interpretation in this broad sense, then, clearly, the determination of a
Gray v. Powell type of question involves statutory interpretation. ° - On
the other hand, it has been urged that the interpretation and application
of statutes are two different things. In this view, interpretation properly
so called includes only the determination of the proper sensible meaning
of the statute. Application is the process of determining whether the facts
of the particular case are within or without that meaning. 3 "The appli-
cation of law is preceded by ... (6) interpretation ... or the discovery
of the legislative intent from the law, in which rules of construction...
are employed"."'
The Supreme Court has indicated that it is in accord with the second
of the above views on the meaning of statutory interpretation, at least
insofar as the problem we are dealing with is concerned. In National
Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, where the question at
issue was similar to that in Gray v. Powell-i.e., that as to the scope of
review available over a Labor Board finding that certain newsboys were
"employees" within the meaning of The National Labor Relations Act-
61. de Sloov~re, Steps in the Process of Interpreting Statutes, 10 N.Y.U.L.Q. 1.E%,. 1
(1932).
62. Compare Benjamin, supra note 24, at 13.
63. de Sloovre, supra note 56, at 17.
64. GAI is, SC=NcE or LAw 89 (3d ed. 1911), quoted in de Sloovre, supra note 56, at 10.
65. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
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the Court implied that the administrative finding on that question in-
volved only application, which was primarily for the agency, and not
interpretation, which was for the courts. "Undoubtedly questions of
statutory interpretation, ... " says Justice Rutledge, "are for the courts
to resolve .... But where the question is one of specific application of
a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering
the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court's function is
limited."66 It does not appear probable that the Court will change this
view in connection with the mandate given to reviewing courts in Section
10'(e) of the Act to "interpret constitutional and statutory provisions."
It is more likely that the Court will hold that an administrative finding
such as that in Gray v. Powell and the Hearst case does not involve stat-
utory interpretation within the meaning of the Act. Hence, the scope of
review will be the same as that in Gray v. Powell.67
A stronger argument for the view that the Act broadens the scope of
review over "mixed questions of law and fact" of the type we have been
considering can perhaps be based upon Section 101(e) (B) (3), which
requires the reviewing court to hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings and conclusions found to be "in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right".
As we have seen, administrative findings of the type at issue in Gray
v. Powell and the Hearst case are findings upon which the administrative
jurisdiction depends, in the sense that their existence is a condition prece-
dent to the lawful exercise of administrative authority. Thus, in the
Hearst case, the National Labor Relations Act was not applicable in the
absence of an employer-employee relationship and the Labor Board was
without power to act if the newsboys involved in that case were not found
to be "employees". Can it not be argued that where administrative juris-
diction is dependent upon a particular finding, Section 10(e) (B) (3) of
the Act requires the reviewing court to determine for itself the correctness
of that finding? In such a case, if the finding is incorrect, is not the
administrative action "in excess of statutory authority"-a matter which
the reviewing court itself must decide under Section 10 (e) (B) (3)?
If the above argument is valid, the Act, in effect, re-imposes the
"jurisdictional fact" theory of review-i.e., that where administrative
66. Id. at 130.
67. The same result would appear to follow with regard to the provision at the end of
the first sentence of Section 10 (e) that the reviewing court determine the meaning or appli.
cability of the terms of any agency action. It is difficult to see how this could broaden the
scope of review over questions of the type we have been considering, for it would seem to
deal with the interpretation of the meaning of validly exercised agency power and not
with the validity of the exercise of power.
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jurisdiction depends upon a finding of fact, the correctness of that finding
must be determined by the reviewing court upon its own independent
judgment. But this, as we have seen, is precisely the doctrine that the
federal courts have abandoned in recent years. That a sound argument
can be made for the thesis that Section 10 (e) (B) (3) does revive the
"jurisdictional fact" doctrine has been shown above. But is that argument
so conclusive as to compel the federal courts to accept it? It is more
probable that the present Court will paraphrase Justice Frankfurter,
concurring in Estep v. United States,"8 if the argument is addressed to
it. "This argument revives, if indeed it does not multiply, all the casuistic
difficulties spawned by the doctrine of 'jurisdictional fact'. In view of
the criticisms which that doctrine.., brought forth and of [its attrition]
through later decisions, one had supposed that the doctrine had earned
a deserved repose."
We are thus brought to the conclusion that the trend discussed in the
first part of this paper in the direction of narrowing the scope of judicial
review of "mixed questions of law and fact" is not affected by Section
10-(e) of the Act. Though arguments can be made to support the con-
trary view, the wording of the statute is probably not strong enough to
compel the federal courts to change the theory of review that has been
firmly established since Gray v. Powell. This is not, of course, to say
that the result we have reached is necessarily the most desirable one.
One can, indeed, assert that the Gray v. Powell line of cases makes effec-
tive judicial control of administration impossible. This is especially true
insofar as the administrator is made the final arbiter of facts upon which
his power to act depends. However valid many of the criticisms of the
"jurisdictional fact" doctrine may be, the total abandonment of that
doctrine presents the danger of going to the other extreme of over-
deference to the administrative judge. 9 Under the Gray v. Powell line
of cases, that danger has become a real one.
68. 327 U.S. 114, 142 (1946).
69. See Benjamin, supra note 24, at 12.
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